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COMMENTS
Churning and the Death of Low Risk Larceny:
Calculating Damages to Redress the
Churning Client's Loss in Portfolio
Value
INTRODUCTION
When a client procures the advice and guidance of a stock broker
and the client permits the broker to make trades in his account at
the broker's discretion, both the client and the broker enter into a
fiduciary and contractual relationship whereby the broker promises
to trade the client's securities pursuant to the client's financial inter-
ests and the client promises to pay commissions to the broker.' As
a result of this relationship, the broker is frequently in a position to
defraud the client.2 One such fraud, churning, is a deceptive prac-
tice which occurs when a stock broker trades securities in his cli-
ent's account with a frequency greater than is warranted by the
client's financial needs, resources, and account size. 3
To prove the requisite fraudulent intent of the broker, the client
must show the broker intended to generate commissions for himself
with little or no regard for his client's investment interests. 4 De-
1. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir. 1983); Miley v. Op-
penheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563
F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Dzenits v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974); Landry v.
Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1973); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). See also, Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange Act
Rule lOb-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 873, 929 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Jacobs]; Brodsky, Damages in Churning and Suitability Cases, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 157
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Brodsky].
2. In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 n.1 (9th Cir. 1970)
(citations omitted), the court stated the following:
The SEC has provided a definition of churning in the regulation under 15
U.S.C. § 780(c) (1). The definition reads: "The term 'manipulative, decep-
tive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance', as used in section 15(c) of the
act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker or dealer designed to
effect with or for any customer's account in respect to which such broker or
dealer or his agent or employee is vested with any discretionary power any
transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency in
view of the financial resources and character of such account."
3. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
4. The intent element is not traditionally associated with churning. Newkirk v.
Hayden, Stone & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
However, since Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), in which the
1
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frauded clients seeking recovery have brought actions inter alia,
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 5
The courts and commentators have had difficulty in calculating
damages in churning cases. This Comment seeks to alleviate the
problem. 6 First, this Comment will discuss the churning cause of
action and the remedial and deterrent purposes underlying the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.7 Second, this Comment will discuss
how and why the courts have limited a churning client's recovery to
the commissions the client paid the broker despite the Act's pur-
poses and the fact that clients usually suffer more damage as a re-
sult of churning activity. 8 Further, it will discuss how the courts
have also based their decisions to limit recovery on the concept of
speculation and the doctrine of suitability.9 Finally, this Comment
will discuss alternative methods of calculating damages in churning
cases which permit clients to recover the loss in their portfolio's
value, and it will propose one method for calculating damages in all
churning cases. 10
I. CHURNING
To recover in a churning case, the client must prove the broker
(1) controlled his account; in effect, the account must be a discre-
tionary one;" (2) traded excessively in the account;' 2 and (3) acted
Supreme Court held there is a scienter element which must be proved in every Rule
lOb-5 case, there has been added the third element in a churning action. See Miley v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp.
1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); and Carroll v. Bear Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
5. However, many states permit recovery for churning activity under state blue
sky laws. Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Civ. Ct.
1970); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones and Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App.2d 690, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 222 (1968); see generally Jacobs, supra note 1. See also, Stoll & Grenley, The
Oregon Remedy for Securities Fraud and the Federal Remedy Available Under Rule
lOb(5): A Comparative Analysis, 14 WILL. L.J. 127 (1978). Also, clients bring suit
under the Securities Act of 1933.
6. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 30, 45 and 67 and accompanying text.
10. Portfolio value is the dollar value of all the securities the client holds. Rolf v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
11. A discretionary account is one in which the customer allows the broker to se-
lect, time and price securities whether they are being bought or sold. Stevens v. Abbott,
Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 839 (E.D. Va. 1968). Moreover, New York Stock
Exchange Rule 408 requires that before discretion can be exercised by the broker, the
brokerage firm must receive an authorization in writing from the customer and initialed
by a partner. Id. at 841.
12. To determine whether trading was excessive, courts consider the turnover rate
in the account. This is computed by dividing the cost of all transactions made in the
account during the period under consideration by the average investment. In turn, the
average investment is determined by dividing the cumulative total of the net investment
2
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with the intent to defraud his client or customer, or he must have
acted with willful disregard for his client's or customer's interests. '3
Whenever a broker churns his client's account, the client should
recover, at least in theory, all the damages proximately caused by
the broker's fraudulent conduct.14 However, courts have struggled
with the issue of calculating a client's actual damages in churning
cases.' 5 They have clearly held that punitive damages cannot be
recovered in any action brought pursuant to the Act. 16 Also, the
Act provides that a client can recover no more than his actual dam-
ages. Yet the courts have frequently limited clients recovery to
quasi-contract. 17
Quasi-contract is based on unjust enrichment principles. ' 8 Here
at the end of each month by the number of months involved. Landry v. Hemphill,
Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 374 (1st Cir. 1974) (citing Note, Churning by Securities
Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1967)).
13. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 424 U.S. 185 (1976).
14. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Also, there
is no real agency issue in churning cases. Generally, the client may recover from the
broker and from the broker's employer, the brokerage house, under either Section 20 of
the Act or common law principles of agency. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
203 (D. Mass. 1978); Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266
(Civ. Ct. 1970); and Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones and Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d
690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968). Moreover, in Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc.,
508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981), the court held that the controlling persons provision
of the Act was the sole standard of liability of broker-dealers for acts of their employees,
and the court also held that broker-dealers are not absolutely liable under common-law
doctrine of respondeat superior. In contrast, in Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn,
629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held:
Where respondeat superior principles are applied, the special good faith de-
fense afforded by the last clause of Section 20(a) is unavailable. Quite apart
from the fact that that conclusion was clearly adumbrated in SEC v. Manage-
ment Dynamics, supra, 515 F.2d at 812-13, and has become settled law in
other circuits, there is no warrant for believing that Section 20(a) was intended
to narrow the remedies of the customers of brokerage houses or to create a
novel defense in cases otherwise governed by traditional agency principles.
On the contrary Section 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb, specifically enacts that the
rights and remedies provided by the "34 Act shall be in addition to any and all
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity, and Section 16 of the
'33 Act, 1S U.S.C. § 77p, similarly provides that the rights and remedies of the
'33 Act additional to pre-existing remedies.
15. Se ra note 1.
16. Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869, 885 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Churning].
17. See Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968), and
Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D.
Cal. 1965).
18. Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91, 621,
at 95,321-22 (S.D. Cal. 1965) provides as follows:
Damages should also be limited to the amount of commissions because this is
the only element of damages which was proximately caused by defendants.
Plaintiff argues defendant improperly bought speculative stocks instead of
class A stocks. But his was admittedly a trading account which means the
purpose was to buy and sell stocks whose value fluctuated hoping to buy at
1984]
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the court considers the broker's gains resulting from his deceptive
practice. The client's recovery is limited to the commissions he paid
to the broker and the taxes and interest that accrued thereupon dur-
ing the churning period. The problem with limiting churning cli-
ent's recovery to quasi-contract damages is that, usually, the
churning activity proximately results in damage to the client far in
excess of the commissions he paid to the broker.19 Generally, a
churning case client suffers a loss in his portfolio value as a result of
the churning activity. Moreover, limiting the churning client's re-
covery to quasi-contract damages fails to deter brokers from churn-
ing other clients' accounts.20 Nevertheless, courts continue to limit
the client's recovery to quasi-contract damages by avoiding the is-
sue of what damages proximately resulted from the broker's fraudu-
lent conduct. 2'
Actions brought pursuant to the Act arise under Section 10b and
Rule 10b-5.22 These sections stem from the "shingle theory" which
provides that when the broker-dealer hangs out his shingle he im-
pliedly represents he will act in the best investment interests of his
client.2 3 The Supreme Court has held that the Act's provisions are
low prices and sell at high prices, or vice versa on short transactions. Class A
stocks fluctuate very little and would not be the best for a trading account.
Therefore, while defendant's choice of stock was unfortunate, his choice was
not so wrong as to give rise to additional damages.
19. The concept of causation is critical to the damages issue in churning cases and
will be discussed throughout this Comment.
20. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Brodsky, supra
note 1, and Note, Churning, supra note 16, at 875.
21. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that plaintiffs should recover no
more than their actual damages. The issue addressed in this Comment is how we deter-
mine what are actual damages in the typical churning case. See infra note 26.
22. The relevant sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Act," are discussed in the context of a churning action in Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co. The court stated:
Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) makes it unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of interstate commerce or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange to use or em-
ploy, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest for the protection of investors.
Pursuant to this Act, the Securities Exchange Commission promulgated
Rule lOb-5, (17 C.F.R. 240.106-5) providing that it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any
device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a
material fact, or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice or
course of business which operates as or would operate as a fraud upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Hecht v. Harris & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (emphasis added).
23. See Note, Churning, supra note 16, at 870.
4
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designed to redress clients injured as a result of a broker's fraudu-
lent and deceptive practices and deter brokers from engaging in
such fraudulent practices in the future.2 4 Moreover, courts have
held that legislative intent requires that the remedial purposes of the
Act are to be liberally construed against the broker and to protect
the financial interests of the client-investor.2 5 However, the Act ex-
plicitly provides that clients may not recover "a total amount in
excess of actual damages on account of the act complained of."'26
Although the Act makes clear its intent concerning the need to re-
dress clients and deter fraudulent brokers, the Act does not suggest
a method by which to calculate damages in securities fraud cases.
2 7
Calculating damages in churning cases has been particularly troub-
lesome.28 Traditionally, a churning case client's recovery has been
limited to the commissions he paid the broker despite the fact that
usually more damage is caused. 29 Courts have so limited damages
based on the following concepts: 1) the client's conduct was such
that it overshadowed the broker's wrong; 2) an award in excess of
quasi-contract would be too speculative; and 3) the broker over-
traded securities which were suitable for the client's investment in-
terests and therefore he should recover no more than his
24. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953), in which the court
stated:
Congress intended to make the control of securities transactions "reasonably
complete and effective" as that phrase is used in the preamble of the Act. We
can think of nothing that would tend more toward discouraging trading off
the established business markets and out of governmental regulation or that
would more certainly tend to deter fraudulent practices in security transac-
tions and thus make the Act more "reasonably complete and effective" than
the right of defrauded sellers or buyers of securities to seek redress in damages
in federal courts."
Id. (footnote omitted)
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the Act is to "achieve a
high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." S.E.C. v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 186 (1963).
Finally, in Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1202 n.8 (9th Cir. 1970),
the court noted that one of the principal Congressional purposes of the Act is to protect
the investor in a highly sophisticated field.
25. This principle is well settled. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964);
Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983); and Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor &
Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968).
26. Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 n.19 (D.
Mass. 1978) provides as follows:
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb provides:
"but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions
of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more
actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act
complained of."
27. See supra note 24.
28. See supra note I.
29. Note, Churning, supra note 16, at 875 (discussing Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone &
Co. [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965)).
5
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commissions paid. Thus, the remedial and deterrent purposes of
the Act have been largely ignored in churning cases.
A. Client's Conduct
The courts have limited the client's recovery even in cases in
which the client has shown the broker controlled and overtraded
the account and intended to defraud the client. The courts have
limited a client's recovery by balancing against the broker's wrong,
the client's education and background, trading experience, accept-
ance of confirmation slips detailing his broker's trading record, and
subscriptions to sophisticated securities or business publications.30
Courts have held that if the broker can show the client was knowl-
edgeable in securities by proving the existance of one of these fac-
tors, then the client's recovery can be limited to the commissions he
paid to the broker; namely, the quasi-contract method of recov-
ery.31 The client is not permitted to recover any loss suffered in his
portfolio value during the churning period. Courts have called such
an affirmative defense either estoppel, waiver, or laches.32
The problem with recognizing this affirmative defense in churn-
ing cases is that the client is denied full recovery despite the bro-
ker's churning activity. To deny the client full recovery because his
knowledge of the market suggested he should have known he was
being defrauded is too harsh a result.33 Churning is a deceptive
30. A classic example is Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 428
(N.D. Cal. 1968), in which the court stated:
Defendants contend, in effect, that plaintiff had acquired a familiarity with
security trading long before her dealings with either defendant Wilder or de-
fendant Harris, Upham, through her dealings in securities since as early as
1928; especially through her accounts maintained with Johnson Company in
the early thirties and with Walston Company between 1936 and 1955; also
through her regular, frequent discussions with Ernest Fairey, her broker for
about 23 years (1931-1955); also through her presence in the Hecht household
where Hecht's dealings, not only in securities but in commodity futures as
well, were a topic of conversation, and, also through her regular reading of the
financial pages of the newspapers.
Id. See also Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1981).
31. Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at 428; see also Mihara v. Dean Whitter & Co., Inc., 619
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980) and Petrites, 646 F.2d 1033.
32. The theories proposed by the Ninth Circuit are 1) estoppel, requiring one party
to reasonably rely to his detriment on the conduct of another; 2) laches, requiring a lack
of due diligence in recognizing the wrong on the plaintiff's part and prejudice to the
defendant; and 3) waiver, requiring the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1970); Fey v.
Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Mihara v. Dean Witter &
Co., 619 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1980) where the court held that since plaintiff should have
known his broker was trading his account excessively, his failure to stop his broker from
continuing to do so constituted breach of the duty to mitigate his damages. The court
limited plaintiff's recovery to quasi-contract.
33. The Hecht court's analysis appears to focus on contributory negligence. Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). Other cases are in accord:
6
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practice whereby the broker intends to defraud his client; hence, it
is an intentional tort.34 It is a well settled principle of tort law that
contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort.35
This principle should be applied in a churning case.36 So long as
the client can show the broker controlled and overtraded his ac-
count and intended to defraud him, the broker should not escape
full liability unless he can show the client's conduct was so flagrant
as to negate one of the elements of the churning cause of action.37
For example, some courts in churning cases have examined the
client's conduct to see if he authorized the trades made by the bro-
ker.38 These courts have reasoned that if the broker can show the
client authorized the trades, he can simultaneously show he neither
controlled, nor excessively traded the client's account.39 Rather, it
was the client's decision to churn the account.
Landry v. Hemphill Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1973) (Customer who was
experienced in the stock market was held to have realized the broker's fraudulent trad-
ing practice and was estopped from arguing he was an investor), and Dzenits v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1974).
34. Nevertheless, churning also consists of contract principles in that the broker
and client enter into a contractual agreement. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
35. "When there is an intent to mislead, it is clearly inconsistent with the general
rule that mere negligence of plaintiff is a defense to an intentional tort." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 716 (4th ed. 1971).
36. Id.
37. If the plaintiff has given the broker discretion over his account sufficient to
satisfy the control element of the churning cause of action, it should be clear that the
client is at the mercy of the broker's judgment. On the other hand, perhaps the control
element should be interpreted strictly against the broker so that only where it can be
said that the broker had no discretion over the account will he be held to have no
control over the account. This would clarify the state of the law today.
38. Powers v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Plain-
tiffs exercised such involvement in the account that the court held the broker did not
control the account and did not trade it excessively. This result appears to be better
reasoned.
39. In Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 957
(E.D. Mich. 1978), the court stated: "The law is clear that if a customer controls his
own securities account he cannot prevail against his broker under a theory of churning,
even where he can prove that the account suffered an excessive number of trades." See
also Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 n.8 (7th Cir. 1983) where the
court stated:
A few courts have suggested, as a third element that the customer must also
have been relatively unsophisticated about the market. See Marshak v. Blyth
Eastman, Dillon & Co., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 377, 379 (N.D. Ok. 1975). But
while it is true that most successful churning plaintiffs have fit within this
category, see Home v. Francis L du Pont & Co., 428 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (D.C.
1977), imposing lack of sophistication as an absolute requirement would ap-
pear to go too far. Even a savvy investor may choose, for various reasons, to
entrust the handling of his account to a broker and there is no reason to im-
munize that broker if he exercises control and intentionally trades the account
excessively. The better view would seem to be that business sophistication is
simply another consideration bearing upon the issue of control.
See also Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
and Newburger, Lbeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977).
7
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In sum, determining whether the client authorized the broker to
trade stocks in his portfolio focuses more clearly on whether the
client has a churning cause of action. The courts' inquiry should
not be focused on whether the client, based on his securities knowl-
edge, should have known his account was being churned at all.4°
The law should deny recovery to clients who have simply been vic-
timized by the market's normal fluctuations or by their own de-
mand that the broker overtrade their account. However, the law
should not reward fraudulent brokers who were fortunate enough
to deal with clients believing themselves to be well versed in securi-
ties trading.4' To do so would be contrary to the deterrent purposes
underlying the Act.42 Moreover, it would fail to redress the client
in light of the broker's wrong since he would not recover any loss he
may have suffered in the value of his portfolio. 43 Nevertheless,
courts have largely limited client's recovery in churning cases based
on the client's knowledge of the market. The courts have also prof-
fered two additional rationales for limiting a client's recovery: spec-
ulation and suitability. 44
B. Speculation
Courts have frequently limited a churning case client's recovery
to quasi-contract damages when any greater award would be too
speculative. 45 Clearly, the uncertainty associated with market in-
vestments and market fluctuations will always make calculating
damages in securities fraud cases inaccurate. 46 The problem is that
one can never say with certainty what his investment would have
yielded had the broker not churned his account. 47
40. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
41. Courts must not become the last recourse for disappointed market investors,
thus clients whose accounts have not been churned should not recover at all in a churn-
ing case.
42. See supra note 24.
43. See supra notes 18, 19 and 20 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 45 and 67 and accompanying text.
45. When are damages too speculative? According to Dobbs, when the plaintiff
can establish the fact of damages with reasonable certainty; but cannot establish the
amount of damage with reasonable certainty. "To some extent this rule is merely an
insistence that the trier of fact may not speculate or conjecture but must instead have
some factual basis for fixing damages." DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.3 (1st ed. 1973).
46. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1981); Kravitz v.
Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1978); and Newkirk v.
Hayden, Stone & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965). See
also Note, Churning, supra note 16, at 882-83.
47. Courts have recognized this problem yet they have handled the calculation of
damages differently. For example, in Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [current] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) i 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965), the court noted it was impossible to say
with certainty what damages were proximately caused by a defendant's churning activ-
ity and that as a result "the damages should be limited to the amount of commissions
wrongfully obtained." In contrast, while recognizing the danger of excessive specula-
[Vol. 21
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In calculating the client's quasi-contract recovery, the courts will
forego the problem of discerning what damages were proximately
caused by the churning. Rather, the courts will presume the broker
acted wrongly with respect to every transaction made in the client's
account since the broker's wrongdoing has caused the calculation of
damages to be speculative. 48 Hence, the courts will return to the
client all the commissions he paid to the broker without fear of
speculating as to whether each of the trades the broker made was
fraudulent. 49 Some courts are unwilling to make a similar presump-
tion for purposes of calculating the client's loss in portfolio value.50
The arguments vary. One provides that an award to the client of
his commissions paid to the broker is precisely what the client
lost.51 Another stresses the impossibility of predicting with cer-
tainty what losses proximately resulted from the churning activ-
ity.52 This argument provides that any attempt to apportion loss in
portfolio value between what was due to the ordinary hazards of a
declining market and what resulted from the churning would be too
speculative.5 3
The arguments against awarding loss of portfolio value in a
churning action due to the speculative nature of the act focus on
churning as a series of individual trades rather than one unified of-
fense; or one continuing wrong.54 No one can point to any particu-
lar transaction and declare it to be the wrong done or the
compensable injury.55 Rather, it is the nature of the churning activ-
ity to overtrade, to escalate the offense's complexity, and to result in
a lack of proof of causation.5 6 The best remedy may be to analyze
the offense with respect to the entire past history of the broker's
tion, in calculating churning damages the court in Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637
F.2d 318, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1981) held that a plaintiff could recover damages for loss in
portfolio value. See also Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203
(D. Mass. 1978) and Note, Churning, supra note 16, at 882-83.
48. It is now elementary that when precise damage measurements are pre-
cluded by wrongful acts, the wrongdoer cannot insist upon exact measure-
ments and the precise tracing of causal lines to an impractical extent; fair
approximations are in order. But the unified nature of the typical churning
offense does not render the element of causation immaterial.
Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. The view disfavoring awards for the loss of portfolio value on the basis of the
speculation issue is rooted in Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co. [current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) Ci 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
51. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 46. See also Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp.
836, 839 (E.D. Va. 1968).
53. Id.
54. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra
note 48.
55. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
56. The most enlightening discussions are contained in Miley v. Oppenheimer &
1984]
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trading pattern as compared to the pattern desired and contracted
for by the investor-client.5 7
Moreover, the arguments against awarding the client his loss in
portfolio value fail to focus on all the damage done to the client.5 8
If the courts limit the client's recovery to the quasi-contract mea-
sure of recovery and the client's portfolio is returned valueless fol-
lowing the churning and not as a result of a decline in the market,
an award of commissions paid the broker cannot fully compensate
the client.5 9 One court has determined the problem to be one of
competing windfalls.60 On the one hand, the client may receive
more than he originally bargained for and thereby attain a position
better than he might have been in had the churning not occurred.61
On the other hand, refusing to award the client his loss in portfolio
value suggests a windfall for the wrongdoer broker. 62 If the courts
must decide which party is to receive a windfall, it would be more
equitable to fully compensate the innocent client than to aid the
wrongdoing broker.63 Finally, the arguments against awarding loss
in portfolio value fail to focus on the dual legislative purpose of the
Act which is to redress a client's losses and to deter brokers from
dealing fraudulently in the future. 64 To illustrate this latter pur-
pose, that of deterrence, a New York state court astutely pointed
out that to limit the client's recovery to quasi-contract damages
would effectively encourage brokers to engage in "low risk lar-
ceny."'65 Thus, future courts should more liberally interpret the
Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1055 (7th
Cir. 1974); and Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The trend today indicates that the trial courts' discretion will be relied
upon in fashioning remedies in churning cases. Note, Churning, supra note 16, at 885;
Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1055 n.26 (9th Cir. 1974).
60. See Justice Goldberg's enlightening if not comical opinion in Miley v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1981).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The Miley court appears to have based its decision on such equitable grounds.
637 F.2d at 328. See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970); Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Civ. Ct. 1970);
and Brodsky, supra note I.
64. One commentator has noted that "deterrence" smacks of punitive damages
which are not recoverable under the Act. This is a pertinent comment since punitive
damages may not be awarded in an action brought under the Act. Nevertheless, an
award of commissions paid may only encourage brokers to churn accounts since (1) the
client may be so unfamiliar with the market he may not complain, and (2) the most for
which he would be liable to the plaintiff is the commissions he wrongfully received.
Thus, the strong policy in encouraging the public to invest in the market could poten-
tially be stymied by broker's fraud. Based on these considerations, and so long as the
court awards damages based on a competent evidentiary showing of client's loss, bro-
kers can be deterred from churning activity without being penalized.
65. Pierce v. Richard Ellis & Co., 62 Misc. 2d 71, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Civ. Ct.
10
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concept of what is speculative to fully redress the client for the
wrong done him and to deter brokers from continuing fraudulent
practices. 66
C. Suitability
Courts and commentators generally concur that a churning case
client should recover no more than the commissions he paid the
broker during the churning period if the securities purchased were
suitable for his investment interests. 67 Suitability focuses on the se-
curities which the broker recommends his client purchase while
churning focuses on the broker's overtrading of his client's ac-
count. 68 The connection between the two actions is that both derive
from the "shingle theory" which basically provides that a broker
will act in the best interests of his client.69 The SEC regulations
provide that a broker can be reprimanded for buying and/or selling
unsuitable securities, 70 without any allegation of churning activ-
ity.7 ' The client must show that the broker reasonably believed he
traded securities which were unsuitable with regard to the client's
financial needs and interests and that despite this belief the broker
traded the securities.72 Courts have also held that if the stocks
1970). The underlying theory here is that trial courts should put more emphasis on the
magnitude of the wrong done the client.
66. Id.
67. The concept is best addressed in Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318
(5th Cir. 1981), and Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
68. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 157.
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
70. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 897.
71. Id.
72. Id. See also Zaretsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
and New York Stock Exchange Rule 405 which provides:
Diligence as to Accounts Rule 405. Every member organization is required
through a general partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer,
every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organi-
zation and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted
or carried by such organization. Supervision of Accounts
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of
the organization. Approval of Accounts
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly
after the completion of any transaction for the account of or with a customer,
provided, however, that in the case of branch offices, the opening of an ac-
count for a customer may be approved by the manager of such branch office
but the action of such branch office manager shall within a reasonable time be
approved by a general partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock in
the organization. The member, general partner or officer approving the open-
ing of the account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally informed
as to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature of the pro-
posed account and shall indicate his approval in writing on a document which
is a part of the permanent records of his office or organization.
CCH N.Y.S.E. § 2405 (emphasis added). Also, the SEC promulgated Rule 15(b) 10-3
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purchased are unsuitable or not in conformity with the investor's
investment goals, then the investor may only recover his commis-
sion paid to the broker despite the fact that the broker churned his
account. 73 In effect, the courts have held that the only wrongdoing
on the broker's part is in the excessiveness of the trading and not in
the trading of unsuitable securities.74 Hence, the client may recover
only that amount of damages which proximately resulted from the
excessiveness of the trading, that is, the commissions the client paid
to the broker during the churning period.75
Despite the separate and distinct natures of these two concepts
the courts insist on unifying them for purposes of awarding dam-
ages in excess of quasi-contract damages in churning cases. 76 For
example, in Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co.,77 the court stated:
Certainly churning an account may conceivably cause damage to
a customer over and beyond the commission and interest gener-
ated by excessive transactions-and undoubtedly did so in this
case. . . . [W]e have found that plaintiff assumed the ordinary
risks of an active trading account in securities and commodities
(as distinguished from maintaining the account as a mere invest-
ment account) .... 78
In Hecht, the plaintiff client desired that her account be handled as
an active trading account. 79 She received confirmation slips detail-
ing the trades made and she did not complain as to the suitability of
the stocks traded.80 Therefore, the court reasoned that, although
her portfolio was churned, she could not recover damages in excess
of the commission she paid to the broker.81 Courts have followed
the reasoning of the Hecht court and limited client's recovery to
quasi-contract damages when either the stocks purchased are "suit-
able" with regard to the client's investment goals and interests or
the client's conduct estops him to argue the purchases were unsuita-
ble. 82 The problem with this analysis is two-fold. First, it does not
address the policies of the Act in that the dishonest broker is not
deterred but is reprieved if he churns the investor's account by over-
trading the client's stocks for stocks the client might have author-
which imposes on brokers the duty to act reasonably and diligently in selecting stocks
that are suitable for a client's purposes.
73. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 157.
74. Id.
75. An instructive landmark is Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417
(N.D. Cal. 1968).
76. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 157-58.
77. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
78. Id. at 440.
79. Id. at 422-23.
80. Id. at 425.
81. Id. at 425-26.
82. Id. at 426-30.
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ized him to purchase.8 3 Second, the analysis confuses the issue of
what damages were proximately caused by the churning activity.
84
It assumes the churning activity causes no more damage to the cli-
ent's account than the loss of the commissions he paid to his broker
for each transaction the broker made.8 5 Rather than make such an
assumption, the courts should allow the client to proffer evidence of
damage to portfolio value which proximately resulted from the
churning activity. 86 This approach to the problem would be feasible
if courts would consider churning to be an unsuitable practice per
se.87 Whether the broker invested in suitable securities may be rele-
vant in determining if the broker controlled the client's account or
intended to defraud the client; but it does not alter the fact that the
client may suffer damage to his portfolio value as a result of the
churning activity. 88 The reason being that the act of churning or
overtrading an account itself may cause damage to a client's portfo-
lio value. s9
In sum, the churning case client should be compensated for all
the losses which proximately resulted from the churning activity. 90
Churning is clearly a fraudulent practice requiring wrongful intent
by the broker. When a client can show his broker churned his ac-
count, limiting his recovery to quasi-contract or damages due to (1)
his own knowledge of the market; (2) the speculativeness of an
award in excess of commissions paid by the client to the broker; or
(3) the suitability of the transactions made by the broker, fails to
redress the client for the damages resulting from the broker's
wrong. A broker may gladly run the risk of churning his client's
account if he knows he need only return to the client his commis-
sions paid upon being sued for conducting a churning scheme.91
Moreover, it does not serve as a deterrent to fraudulent brokers.92
However, there are alternative methods of calculating damages
which should make courts more willing to award churning case cli-
83. Id. at 428-30. The Hecht court addressed the issues of plaintiff's conduct and
suitability. The court held that plaintiff's conduct estopped him to argue the trades
made by the broker were unsuitable in light of his investment goals and desires.
84. See supra notes 19, 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
85. A classic example is Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
86. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
87. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 159; but cf.: "If the securities are churned but they
are suitable for the customer's account, the commissions and interest should be
returned ....
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
91. This is what one court has called "low risk larceny." Pierce v. Richard Ellis &
Co., 62 Misc. 2d 771, 310 N.Y.S. 2d 266 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
92. To escape liability and to effect these policies, the broker must be able to show
he did not churn.
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ent's damages for loss in portfolio value.93 They are the out-of-
pocket-loss and loss of bargain methods of calculating damages.94
II. METHODS OF CALCULATING CLIENT'S Loss IN
PORTFOLIO VALUE
There are primarily two methods of calculating client's loss in
portfolio value in churning cases. They are the out-of-pocket-loss
and loss of bargain method. 95
A. Out-of-Pocket-Loss
The out-of-pocket-loss method of calculating damages returns to
the client the difference between the client's portfolio value before
and after the churning activity. 96 For example, a churning client
may give his broker discretion to trade the securities in his portfo-
lio. It is valued at $1,000 on January 1. On January 30, the client
discovers his broker churned his account. On January 30, the port-
folio value is $100. If the trial judge were to apply the out-of-
pocket-loss method of calculating damages, the client's loss would
be $1,000 minus $100, or $900.97 Thus, the focus shifts from the
quasi-contract method's notion of broker's gain to that of client's
loss.98 This method is an effective remedial measure because it
would likely deter brokers from churning. If the broker knew he
was responsible for the client's portfolio loss, the increased financial
93. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. These are the most readily used alternative methods of calculating damages in
churning cases.
96. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones and Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
97. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones and Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69
Cal. Rptr. 222 (1st Dist. 1968), is a case in which plaintiffs failed to proffer evidence
supportive of the loss of bargain method of calculating damages, the court determined
that damages for churning are limited to the commissions earned but that in the present
case plaintiff had been left with unsuitable securities and a huge loss. In such a case, the
court decided that "[d]efendants . . . are in no position to object to the out-of-pocket
rule adopted by the court." Id. at 732, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 251. The Twomey formula was
outlined as follows:
Initial portfolio value ............................................ $52,668.00
Amount which would have been earned ............................ 10,206,00
Subtract from this sum the following: Value of the Returned Portfolio . $14,843.25
Profits from Sales and Dividends .................................. 15,674.04
Plaintiff's award: $62,874.00 - $30,517.29 = $32,356.71. Id. at 730, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
249.
98. Id. This shift is probably more appropriate; however, it also threatens to pro-
vide clients much more than they would have recovered under normal market condi-
tions. As will be discussed later in this paper, such a result is unnecessary.
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risk of churning his client's account may outweigh his desire to
fraudulently accrue commissions.99 Nevertheless, it is also an inef-
fective remedial measure because it does not redress the client's loss
so much as it penalizes the broker for churning the client's ac-
count. 10° Hence, the out-of-pocket-loss method of calculating dam-
ages may potentially overcompensate the client just as limiting a
client's recovery based on the client's knowledge of the market, by
the concept of speculation or the doctrine of suitability, may serve
to undercompensate the churning client.' 0 ' Again the central prob-
lem is one of causation. A client's out-of-pocket losses do not take
into account the damages caused by the normal fluctuations of the
stock market. 102 If, during normal market fluctuations, the client's
portfolio would have suffered a loss in its value, the out-of-pocket-
loss method would put the client in a position better than he would
have been in if the churning had not occurred. Thus, while the out-
of-pocket-loss method more correctly approaches the damages issue
in churning cases, it is not the best solution to the problem. More-
over, the fact that the out-of-pocket-loss method arguably serves to
penalize brokers rather than redress a client for his actual damages,
suggest that this method is prohibited by the Act.
B. Loss of Bargain
A better method is based on a loss of bargain recovery which
provides that the client recovers all he would have gained had the
broker not churned his account.' 0 3 The Second Circuit has most
recently applied a formula based on the loss of bargain method in
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,1°4 a securities fraud case. The
formula is the product of a litany of opinions and has received posi-
tive critical reinforcement by cases and commentators. 10 5 For ex-
ample, the Miley court stated:
In order to approximate the trading losses caused by the broker's
99. See supra note 91.
100. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. It is clear that punitive damages are
not recoverable in an action brought pursuant to the Act, see supra note 26.
101. Thus, while quasi-contract may not award clients enough recovery, out-of-
pocket-loss threatens to award clients more than their actual damages.
102. Id.
103. Note, Churning, supra note 16.
104. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
105. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
("Rolf I"); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) ("Rolf II"); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,919 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Rolf IIr'); Rolf
v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Rolf V"); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,201
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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misconduct, it is necessary to estimate how the investor's portfo-
lio would have fared in the absence of the such misconduct. [sic]
The trial judge must be afforded significant discretion to choose
the indicia by which such estimation is to be made, based primar-
ily on the types of securities comprising the portfolio. However,
in the absence of either a specialized portfolio or a showing by
either party that a different method is more accurate, it seems
that the technique discussed by Judge Oakes in Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillion & Co., and employed by Judge Mahon in this
case is preferable. . . . This mode of estimation utilizes the av-
erage percentage performance in the value of the Dow Jones In-
dustrials or the Standard and Poor's Index during the relevant
period as the indicia of how a given portfolio would have per-
formed in the absence of the broker's misconduct. 106
The following five steps are part of the Rolf formula and would
be the most appropriate for calculating damages in any churning
action. 107
Step One.-The first step in determining the calculation of dam-
ages in a churning action is to determine the market value of the
client's portfolio on the date the fraudulent conduct began. 108 To
determine the date the fraudulent conduct began, the court must
decide, based on the facts before it, when the broker first controlled
and overtraded the client's account and intended to defraud the cli-
ent. 0 9 Next, to determine when the broker first had control of the
account and when he began to overtrade the client's securities, the
court can usually inspect monthly reports from the broker or his
firm which are sent to the client concerning each transaction
made.1 0 However, to determine when the broker first manifested
the intent to defraud the client, the court will have to make a factual
determination of the broker's intent to defraud the client by consid-
ering the extent of the overtrading in the client's account."'I Fi-
nally, to calculate the market value of client's portfolio on the date
106. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (footnote omit-
ted) ( citations omitted). See also Brodsky, supra note 1, at 160; and Note, Churning,
supra note 16. But compare Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91,621 (S.D. Cal. 1965). (Plaintiffs recovery limited to quasi-contract
measure of recovery).
107. An excellent discussion is contained in, inter alia, Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dil-
lon & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
and Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980).
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. Id. See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
111. Clearly, a "showing of reckless disregard" would be sufficient to prove intent.
Court's have also considered turnover rate, "in and out trading" and prolonged holding
periods as evidence of intent to defraud. The first of these considerations, the turnover
rate, is calculated by dividing the cost of all purchases made in the account during the
churning period by the average investment. In Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d
814 (9th Cir. 1980), the court held that an annualized turnover rate of four would be
[Vol. 21
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the fraudulent conduct began, the court should multiply the
number of shares of each security in the portfolio by the price of the
security on the date the fraudulent conduct began.1 12 Next, the
court should aggregate the resulting totals of the number of each
security multiplied by the price of each security. 113 The resulting
figure is the market value on the date the fraud began. 114
Step Two.-The second step in assessing damages is to choose an
appropriate index by which to adjust the client's portfolio value. 115
This step allows the client to adjust his portfolio value by an appro-
priate index to determine what he would have had if the broker had
not churned the account. However, the client may recover no more
than this amount.1 16 The court must choose an index which would
show market movement closely related to the movement the client's
stocks would have undergone but for the churning. 117 Selecting an
appropriate index is the most important step in the formula. If the
chosen index measures the movement of stocks closely related to
the client's own, then the danger of awarding speculative damages is
presumptive of churning while a turnover rate of greater than six might be conclusive of
churning activity. See also In re Matter of J. Logan & Co., 41 S.E.C. 88 (1962).
The second consideration, "in and out" trading, occurs when the broker engages in a
pattern of trading consisting of all or part of his client's portfolio with the money imme-
diately reinvested in other securities. Following a short period of time, these newly
acquired securities are sold.
Finally, courts consider the length of time the broker held the client's securities
before selling them. Evidence of short holding periods has been deemed persuasive evi-
dence of the requisite churning intent. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814
(9th Cir. 1980).
112. In Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the plaintiff contended that since his account
was handled on a cash basis and certain shares were not paid for until after the initial
date of plaintiffs portfolio market value, those shares should not be included as part of
plaintiff's initial market value. Plaintiff's contention was based on the fact that he paid
$144,000 for the shares while their market value was only $118,500, thus, adding the
shares to plaintiff's portfolio would result in a loss of $25,500 in plaintiff's account. The
court held that the shares should be included in the initial market value of plaintiff's
portfolio. The court provided no rationale for its conclusion, however, the better rule is
that if plaintiff requests his broker to purchase certain stocks, those stocks are consid-
ered purchased for purposes of calculating the initial market value of plaintiff's
portfolio.
113. See infra note 114.
114. Hence, if plaintiff had ten shares of X security valued at $5 per share, and ten
shares of Y security valued at $10 per share on the date which the fraudulent conduct
began, the resulting products would be $50 of security X and $100 of security Y. Ad-
ding these figures plaintiff's market value is $150.
115. Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980); Rolfv. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); and Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,919 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
116. An interesting discussion is contained in Note, Churning: A Critical Analysis,
14 N.Y.L.F. 317, 344 (1968).
117. See infra note 141.
1984]
17
Romano: Churning and the Death of Low Risk Larceny: Calculating Damages t
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
ameliorated.' 18 Moreover, it is unnecessary to inquire whether the
stocks purchased were suitable for the client's investment goals and
interests because, if the purchases were suitable, the index's move-
ment would likely parallel the market movement which would have
resulted in the client's loss of portfolio value under normal market
conditions.' 19 Thus, the client would not recover damages for the
loss of portfolio value which the churning did not cause.120
To choose an index, there are essentially two issues with which
the court must deal. First, the court must choose an appropriate
index.' 2 ' Second, the court must adjust the client's portfolio value
by the percentage of market movement in the index during the
churning period. 22
Regarding the first issue, choosing an appropriate index, the trial
court may, at its discretion, use any index it deems appropriate. 23
To determine what is appropriate the court should consider the
quality of the stock when the fraudulent conduct began.' 24 For ex-
ample, if a churning case client had twenty securities in his portfo-
lio, most of which were issued by industrial companies, then the
court could use an index indicative of the overall market movement
of industrial stocks such as Standard & Poor's Industrial Stock In-
dex. In contrast, if most of the client's twenty securities were issued
at a price of less than ten dollars per share, the court could adjust
the client's portfolio's market value by an index indicative of the
market movement of low prices stocks such as Standard & Poor's
Low Priced Index. Both these indices are well recognized ones;
however, the court is not limited to selecting a well recognized in-
dex.' 25 The court may select any appropriate index.' 26
In searching for the appropriate index, the Rolf court expressly
declined to use an actual share index or a composite index to adjust
118. The Rolf formula would at least in theory remedy the speculativeness issue;
hence, it would be more appealing in practice than the out-of-pocket-loss method for
both courts and clients.
119. This argument detracts from the argument of those courts supporting the con-
cept of limiting damages in churning cases in which the broker does not invest in "un-
suitable" securities. See also supra note 67.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
122. Id. But the Rot court held that the client could only adjust his portfolio value
by a percentage decrease in an appropriate index during the churning period. The Rot(
court's holding should be read to encompass both percentage decreases and increases in
an appropriate index during the churning period. Only by adjusting portfolio value in
either case can a client be fully compensated.
123. See supra note 105.
124. Id.
125. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
126. Id. The Rolf courts clearly confirm that the choice of an index is a discretion-
ary decision. Rot, 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the client's portfolio's market value.127 An actual share index pro-
vides that the actual shares in the client's portfolio be adjusted by
their market activity during the period of fraudulent conduct. 28
The use of this index rests on the presumption that the broker
would have made no trades during the period of fraudulent con-
duct. 29 Since the churning case client confides in the broker to
engage in some trading activity, this index is inadequate to measure
the client's losses in portfolio value and should not be used. The
Rolf court also rejected a composite index proffered by the bro-
ker.' 30 The composite index was a weighted average index calcu-
lated as follows: First, the broker determined all the industries in
which the client held stock. Second, the broker determined the dol-
lar value of the stock the client held in each industry. Third, the
broker chose six industry indices which contained stocks of roughly
the same dollar value as client's stocks. Finally, the broker adjusted
the client's portfolio's market value by the average increase or de-
cline of the six industry indices during the period of fraudulent
conduct. 131
The court rejected the use of the composite index because it in-
correctly equated the quality of a stock with the dollar value of sim-
ilar stocks in the same industry. 32 The quality of a stock is
determined by factors other than mere dollar value.' 33 Despite the
court's criticism of the broker's composite index it did not hold that
it should always be discarded in favor of a well recognized index. 134
When a party can show that the composite index's stocks and the
stocks in the client's portfolio are in the same industry; of the same
dollar value; and of the same quality, the composite index may be
adopted by the court. 35 It can be a more reliable and accurate in-
127. In Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH)
98,201 at 91,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court rejected the use of an actual share index
because its use "rests on the faulty premise that Rolf's investment advisor would have
made no sales or purchases during the aiding and abetting period ...... Thus, the
court indicated that using an actual share index is always inherently suspect.
128. Id.
1°A Id.
130. Id. However, the court's holding is unclear. It appears the court held that a
composite index can be used in other cases but in light of plaintiff Rolf's account and
investment interests, the composite index was not the most appropriate one available in
the Rolf case.
131. Although it is nowhere explicitly set out in the opinion, this analysis is implicit
in the court's discussion. The court implied that if defendants could have shown that
Rolf had requested defendants trade in certain industries with indices identical to those
indices proferred by defendants, the composite index would have been acceptable. Id.
132. Id.
133. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,201, (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
134. See supra note 105.
135. This was first recommended in Note, Churning, supra note 16, at 882, 883.
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dex than a well recognized one because it is based on the market
movement of many indices closely related to the stocks in the cli-
ent's portfolio, while a well recognized index reflects the market
movement of one broadly based index.' 3 6 The well recognized in-
dex does not bear as close a relation to the client's own stocks as the
composite index.' 37
Further, the composite index can be made even more accurate in
its application. If the court is willing to look at the comparative
market movement in several indices during the churning period to
adjust the client's portfolio's market value, it should be willing to
look at comparative stocks of similar dollar value and quality and in
the same industry. By applying this latter composite index, the
court may actually consider the market movement of stocks almost
equal to the client's own during the churning period. 138
The court has wide discretion in determining whether to use a
well recognized index or a composite index. 139 However, in exercis-
ing this discretion, the court should be guided by the policy against
speculating as to damages. The parties will always proffer to the
court the index most favorable to their client's interests.140 To se-
lect the most appropriate index, the courts should consider whether
there is a close relation between the value, quality, and type of
stocks in the client's portfolio and the index proffered.' 4 ' However,
while courts are free to choose either type of index, they should
always opt for the index which is the most accurate in determining
the client's actual damages; and thereby avoid speculation. 42
Regarding the second issue, adjusting the client's portfolio value,
the Rolf court held that the client's portfolio value should have been
multiplied by the percentage decrease in the appropriate index. 43
Because the client's index showed a percentage increase during the
churning period, his portfolio value remained unchanged for pur-
poses of calculating his damages.44 In effect, the court declined to
adjust the client's portfolio value unless he would have suffered a
136. See supra note 105.
137. See infra note 141.
138. The composite index suggested for use in this Comment is also discussed in
Brodsky, supra note 1, at 160.
139. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
140. Id. at 94,413.
141. The suggested "close relation" test would properly place the court's focus on
the kind of account plaintiff had prior to the churning. If the court chooses an index
closely related to plaintiff's account and his investment interests, the chance of award-
ing plaintiff's excessive damages is decreased substantially.
142. See supra note 105.
143. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 98,201, 94,413
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
144. Id.
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loss during the period of fraudulent activity. 145 The court probably
reasoned that a court cannot restore a plaintiff to a better position
than he would have been in if the fraud had not occurred. 146 The
court's analysis was clearly guided by the Act's decree that a plain-
tiff can recover no more than his "actual damages."1 47 However,
the court could have taken its analysis further by permitting client
Rolf to adjust his portfolio's value by the percentage increase in the
appropriate index. Had the court done so, it would not have re-
stored plaintiff to a better position than he would have been in if the
fraud had not occurred. Rather, it would have restored plaintiff to
a position similar to the one he would have been in had the fraud
not occurred. If the market index showed an overall percentage
increase during the period of fraudulent activity, then it could be
fairly said that the client's portfolio value would have increased
during the same period. Thus, an adjustment by a percentage in-
crease in the market would be justified. Once the appropriate index
is chosen, the court can proceed to the next step.
Step Three.-The third step used by the Rolf court is to deter-
mine the client's portfolio value at the closing date of the fraudulent
activity. 148 This figure is then subtracted from the sum total deter-
mined from Steps One and Two. The court must determine, based
on the facts of the case, when the broker either lost control of the
account, stopped trading excessively, or relinquished the intent to
defraud his client. 149 The closing market value is that dollar value
of all the stocks in the client's portfolio at the time the broker termi-
nated the churning activity.' 50 The court should subtract the mar-
ket value of the client's portfolio on the date the broker stopped
churning his account from the adjusted market value of the client's
portfolio on the date the churning began. 151
Step Four.-The fourth step in calculating client's recovery is to
return to the client all the commissions he paid to the broker during
the period of fraudulent conduct; the quasi-contract measure of re-
covery. Thus, under this formula, quasi-contract recovery becomes
145. Id.
146. Id. at 94,414.
147. See supra note 26.
148. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
149. In effect, the court must determine when the broker first stopped churning the
client's account.
150. Id.
151. A hypothetical is helpful. When plaintiff's portfolio is valued at $100,000 at
the beginning of the churning period and $20,000 at the end of the churning period, and
the most appropriate index increased by three percent during the churning period,
plaintiff's recovery is $83,000. The calculation is as follows:
($100,000 x 3% [i.e., $3,000] plus $100,000 = 103,000) - $20,000 = $83,000
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one element of full recovery. 152
Step Five.-The fifth step is to calculate prejudgment interest on
the sum total of the client's recovery under Steps One through
Four. 153
The following chart demonstrates how the above formula would
be applied in a typical churning case. Assume the following facts:
X, a client, went to Y, a stock broker, with a portfolio containing A,
B, C, & D securities on July 1, 1983. X owned 100 shares of each
security and each security had a value of $9.00 per share. Y
churned X's account until January 1, 1984. Upon X's calling a halt
to Y's deceptive practice, X's portfolio contained securities E, F, G,
& H. X owned seventy-five (75) shares of each security and each
security had a value of $7.00 per share. Moreover, during the
churning period, X paid Y $1,000 in commissions. At trial on Jan-
152. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t
98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Rolf formula makes quasi-contract recovery a founda-
tional element on which to build plaintiff's recovery. However, RoIf is not purely a
churning case. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). Moreover, in Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978),
the court stated: "We are not capable of precisely measuring Rolf's damages on this
appeal, although we do not think that they were so speculative as to compel resort
solely to damages as in a churning case, for commissions paid the broker (and interest
thereon)." Id. at 48. It was not until Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th
Cir. 1981), that a court applied the Rolf formula in a garden variety churning case.
153. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,201 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Also, in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [current] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 98,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court calculated Rolf's damages as
follows:
Market value of plaintiff's portfolio as of July 31, 1969
(beginning of the aiding and abetting period) ............... $808,976.52
Adjustment for market factors during the aiding and abetting
period.
Less: Market value of plaintiff's portfolio as of January 21,
1971 (closing date of aiding and abetting period) ........... 211,129.98
Plus: Brokerage commissions paid by plaintiff during the
aiding and abetting period ............................... 19,894.42
Plus: Interest earned on plaintiff's margin account during
the aiding and abetting period ........................... 2,369.26
Less: Credits for withdrawals of cash and securities during
the aiding and abetting period ........................... 66,671.78
CARRIED FORWARD .............................. $553,438.44
BROUGHT FORWARD ............................. $553,438.44
Plus: 7% annual interest, calculated from January 21,
1971 to March 22, 1973 (date of Delanair settlement)
($553,438.44 X 7% X 2.1667 years) ..................... 83,939.45
Less: Value to plaintiff of the Delanair settlement ........ 153,411,25
$483,966.64
Plus: 7% annual interest, calculated from March 22, 1973
present (August 26, 1981) ($483,966.64 X 7% X 8.43 years) 285,588.70
TOTAL DAMAGES $769,555.34
Thus, plaintiff is entitled to damages of $769,555.34.
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uary 1, 1985, the judge determined that Standard & Poor's Low
Priced Index was the appropriate one by which to adjust X's portfo-
lio value. The index showed a four percent (4%) increase during
the churning period. Also, the trial judge determined that prejudg-
ment interest would be calculated at ten percent (10%) annually.
The calculation of damages would be as follows: 154
STEP ONE: PORTFOLIO VALUE ON THE DATE THE
CHURNING BEGAN:
(Number of securities (4) multiplied by the number of
shares (100) multiplied by the prices per share ($9.00)..
.................................................. $3,600.00
STEP TWO: ADJUST PORTFOLIO VALUE ON THE
DATE THE CHURNING BEGAN BY THE PER-
CENTAGE MOVEMENT OF AN APPROPRIATE
INDEX. (4% of $3,600 plus $3,600) .............. $3,744.00
STEP THREE: SUBTRACT THE PORTFOLIO VALUE
ON THE DATE THE CHURNING ENDED. ($3,744
minus the total number of securities (4) multiplied by the
number of shares (75) multipied by the price per share
($7.00)) ........................................... $1644.00
STEP FOUR: ADD ALL COMMISSIONS CLIENT PAID
BROKER TO TOTAL OF STEPS ONE THROUGH
THREE .......................................... $2644.00
STEP FIVE: ADD 10% ANNUAL PREJUDGMENT IN-
TEREST CALCULATED FROM DATE THE
CHURNING BEGAN TO PRESENT. ($2644.00 multi-
plied by 10% multiplied by six months (0.5
year) = $132.20 .................................... $2,776.20
TOTAL DAMAGES ............................. $2,776.20
In sum, the Rolf formula will allow courts to come nearer to
compensating the client's actual loss as a result of churning. 155 The
formula would redress client's loss because it recognizes the normal
154. This hypothetical is designed to demonstrate the simplicity and accuracy in
calculating churning damages pursuant to a Rolf-type formula.
155. The Rolf formula recognizes the fact that there will be complications in the
trading process which do not lend themselves to easy calculation. The case sets out
three rules for making calculations where plaintiff has (1) a margin account; (2) made
withdrawals of cash from his account; and (3) settled with other defendants.
First, when plaintiff has a margin account, one in which the customer advances only
a portion of a securities purchase price and the broker puts up the rest, plaintiff is
entitled to recover all the interest accrued thereon during the period of fraudulent con-
duct.
Second, when the plaintiff has made withdrawals; taking money from his account to
make other securities purchases, "the court must determine whether the withdrawal
was used to purchase securities fraudulently recommended by (defendant)." If so, de-
fendants' may subtract the withdrawal from plaintiffs portfolio's losses. For purposes
of churning actions, if the withdrawal was made by plaintiff and used by defendant in
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fluctuations of the market and thereby serves as an accurate esti-
mate of how much the client would have gained but for the churn-
ing. Moreover, the potential for large awards assures the formula's
deterrent effect.
CONCLUSION
To terminate low risk larceny in churning cases, the courts must
not limit the client's recovery to the commission the client paid to
the broker-quasi-contract recovery. The courts must recognize
the remedial and deterrent purposes underlying the Act. Moreover
in assessing the client's damages, the courts must bear in mind the
fact that churning activity causes more damage to the client than
the loss of the commissions he paid to the broker. Churning may
cause damage to the client's portfolio value. To redress the client's
loss, courts must be more liberal when examining client's conduct,
such that the court does not fail to focus on the elements of the
churning cause of action. Brokers who act fraudulently must not
receive a reprieve if they deal with clients who are knowledgeable in
securities. Also, the courts should not limit the client's recovery
based on the concept of speculation or the doctrine of suitability.
Courts should relax the inquiry into speculation to favor the inno-
cent client. Courts should not inquire into suitability because
churning an account makes any transaction unsuitable per se.
The courts should be prepared to invoke one method for calculat-
ing damages in all churning cases. The best formula is one akin to
that proferred by the Second Circuit. That method allows the client
to recover for the bargain he lost by multiplying his opening portfo-
lio value by the percentage market movement in an appropriate in-
dex and by subtracting from the resulting amount the client's
portfolio's closing value. This method is logical and easy to apply.
Moreover, its use will bring courts closer to compensating the cli-
ent's actual damages resulting from the broker's churning activity.
Finally, it will force brokers to weigh the high risks of churning an
furtherance of the churning objective: defrauding plaintiff, the defendant is not entitled
to subtract the withdrawal from plaintiff's portfolio's losses.
Finally, the Roll court allowed defendant to subtract the value of plaintiff's settle-
ment with another defendant from plaintiff's portfolio's losses. This factor is the most
germaine to Rolf. There, defendant Delanair was a low-grade corporation in which
Roll's broker invested plaintiff's money. The Delanair's stocks value plummeted. The
stocks had a closing market value of $21,588.75. Plaintiff settled with Delanair for
S175,000. Therefore, defendants were "entitled to a credit of S153,411.25 for the settle-
ment." See supra note 105.
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account. In this way the courts will be able to enforce the purposes
underlying the Act, and end low risk larceny.
Michael F.J. Romano*
* The author was honored with the Scriba Regis Award by the 1983-84 Board of
Editors of the CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW. This comment was considered
the best written student article of the year.
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